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LENDER LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP
— by Neil E. Harl*
Until enactment of the comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 or
Super Fund, lender liability for the clean-up of
environmental damage to the lender's collateral was rarely
discussed. That has not been the case in recent years.2
Language of CERCLA
Under CERCLA, if toxic materials are found on
mortgaged property, or if violations occur, the costs of
cleaning up the hazardous wastes can be assessed against
the owner or operator of the real property involved.3  The
statute imposes liability on an "owner or operator."  As the
statute states —
"...in the case of an on-shore facility or an offshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility...."
can be held liable under the act.4 The statute then proceeds
to limit the liability of lenders —
"Such term [owner or operator] does not include a
person who, without participating in the management of
a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.”5
The issue of lender liability, not surprisingly, was soon
litigated.  In United States v. Mirabile,6 the court held that
there was a material issue of fact of whether a bank's control
of a borrower's operation was sufficient for the bank to be
held liable under CERCLA.7  The following year, in United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,8 the court held that
the foreclosure of property of a debtor that is contaminated
with hazardous materials exposes the creditor to liability for
clean-up of the site.  The court reasoned that the security
interest exception protected only those holding such rights
at the time of the clean-up.  Thus, the court concluded, after
the bank foreclosed on the property and obtained title, the
statutory protection was lost.9 The court granted partial
summary judgment against the bank as a secured creditor.10
Both of these cases were decided by district courts.
The key decision, United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp.,11  was decided in 1990 by the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeal. The court extended the reach of CERCLA as to
lenders as "owners or operators" by stating that lenders
could be liable if they —
"...participat[e]  in the financial management of a facility
to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the
corporation's treatment of hazardous waste."12
_____________________________________________________
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The court pointed out that liability would not be imposed
where the secured creditor monitored selected aspects of a
debtor's business.13 The court also noted that a secured
creditor could become involved in an occasional and
discrete financial decision relating to the protection of its
security interest without incurring liability.14
The court in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.15
believed that its approach would have three positive results
— (1) potential mortgagees would be encouraged to
investigate thoroughly hazardous waste disposal practices
of potential borrowers; (2) lenders would be encouraged to
monitor the hazardous waste policies of their debtors and
insist on compliance with environmental standards as a
precondition to continued financial support, and (3) once a
lender's involvement becomes sufficiently broad to risk
losing its exemption from CERCLA liability, there would
be a strong inducement to institute proper waste disposal
rather than ignoring the problem.
The uproar over the Fleet Factors decision16 led to
efforts to amend the statute. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) responded with a revised lender liability rule
that has been characterized as "...complex and lender
friendly."17 The EPA rule defined "participating in the
management of a facility" in terms substantially more
restrictive18 than the court decision in Fleet Factors.19 The
revised EPA regulation specified —
"Participation in the management of a facility means
actual participation in the management or operational
affairs of the vessel or facility by the holder, and does
not include the mere capacity to influence, or the
unexercised right to control facility operations."20
The EPA rule then proceeded to state that a lender is
participating in management while the borrower is in
possession of the facility encumbered by the security
interest only if the lender either —
"(i) Exercises decision making control over the
borrower's environmental compliance, such that the
[lender] has undertaken responsibility for the borrower's
hazardous waste handling or disposal practices; or
"(ii) Exercises control at a level comparable to that of a
manager of the borrower's enterprise such that the
[lender] has assumed or manifested responsibility for the
overall management of the enterprise encompassing the
day-to-day decision making of the enterprise...."21
The EPA rule also provided guidance on potential liability
in conjunction with a foreclosure —
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"Indicia of ownership that are held primarily to protect a
security interest include legal or equitable title acquired
through or incident to foreclosure and its equivalents."22
The rule then pointed out that —
"The indicia of ownership held after foreclosure
continue to be maintained primarily as protection for a
security interest provided that the holder undertakes to
sell, re-lease the property...or otherwise divest itself of
the property in a reasonably expeditious manner...."23
Neither CERCLA nor the EPA rule require a
prospective mortgagee to conduct an environmental audit at
the site to qualify for the "lender exemption." Thus it is
clear that —
• A lender remains within the exemption during the term
of the security interest even though action is taken to police
the loan.
• The exemption can be maintained even in the event of
foreclosure provided the lender undertakes to sell or
otherwise divest itself of the property in a reasonably
expeditious manner using normal commercial means
provided the mortgagee did not participate in management
prior to the foreclosure.
• Following foreclosure, while the mortgagee is holding
the property for disposition, the lender may liquidate,
maintain business activities, wind up operations or perform
environmental clean-up operations.
EPA rule held invalid
In a major development in 1994, much to the surprise of
lenders, the EPA rule was invalidated in Kelley v. EPA.24
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the Kelley case
in January of 1995. The lending community responded with
renewed efforts to lobby for Congressional relief.25 The
lender liability provisions of that legislation would have
differed from the EPA rule in two major respects —
(1) lenders would be required to perform pre-loan due
diligence as a precondition to receiving favored treatment,
and (2) qualifying lenders would still be liable for the net
gains realized, if any, as a result of clean-up activities by
EPA. The legislation did not pass in 1994. Legislation has
been introduced in 1995 and is pending in the 104th
Congress.26 That legislation would adopt many of the
provisions in the EPA rule statutorily.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors were livestock and
grain farmers who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The
debtors had granted a pre-petition security interest to their
parents in farm machinery and livestock. The debtors
claimed exemptions in all farm equipment, livestock and
farm produce under Minn. Stat. § 550.37(5) and sought to
avoid the security interest in the machinery and livestock
under Section 522(f)(2)(B) as impairing the debtors’
exemption for those assets. The trustee objected to the
exemptions and avoidance of the security interest, arguing
that the trustee had the power to avoid the security interest
as unperfected; therefore, the debtors could not claim an
exemption for the property reclaimed by the trustee. The
court held that because the debtors sought avoidance first,
the trustee was barred from attempting to avoid the security
interest. The court held that Section 522(f)(2)(B) did not
apply to livestock or crops not used for the personal benefit
of the debtors; therefore, the security interest could not be
avoided as to those assets but could only be avoided as to
the debtors’ tools of the trade which included a long list of
assets from a tractor to livestock huts. In re Flitter, 181
B.R. 938 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).
The debtors claimed an exemption in a residence which
was subject to a mortgage and a judicial lien in excess of the
fair market value of the property. The debtors sought to
avoid the judicial lien and the issue was whether the entire
lien was avoidable or whether the lien was avoidable only to
the extent of the debtors’ exemption amount. The case was
filed after the effective date of the 1994 amendment to
Section 522(f) and the court held that the amendment
codified the holding of In re Brantz, 106 B.R. 62 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1989) which held that the lien was avoidable only
to the extent the lien impaired the exemption. In re
Thomsen, 181 B.R. 1013 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
